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This paper uni¯es the theories of Nash implementation and Bayesian im-
plementation in a single framework. Environments considered are such that
each agent's characteristics include, in addition to a speci¯cation of his pri-
vate information, a commonly known type parameter, while both attributes
are unknown to the designer. Each social choice correspondence (SCC) as-
signs a commonly known type vector to a social choice set, a collection of
functions mapping private type vectors to allocations.
Conditions that fully characterize an implementable SCC in economic
environments where agents are not satiated generalize and merge respec-
tive conditions in the complete information model of Danilov (1992) and
the incomplete information model of Jackson (1991). In noneconomic envi-
ronments there remains to exist a gap between the necessary and su±cient
conditions, like in Jackson (1991). In order to narrow down this gap, we em-
ploy Danilov's notion of essential elements and develop a stronger necessary
condition, termed essential-generalized-Bayesian monotonicity (EGBM).
Keywords: Bayesian implementation, Nash implementation, mecha-
nism, complete information, incomplete information, social choice correspon-
dence.
1. INTRODUCTION
In this paper, we provide a uni¯ed framework in which the theories of both Nash
implementation and Bayesian (Nash) implementation can be accommodated. We
also discuss whether Danilov's (1992) notion of essential elements can be used to
¯ll the gap between the necessary and su±cient conditions of implementation in
noneconomic environments.
An environment is called economic if agents cannot be simultaneously satiated,
and noneconomic otherwise. The problem of implementing social choice sets in
both economic and noneconomic environments involving agents that have incom-
plete information about the state of the society is examined by Jackson (1991).
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He de¯nes social choice functions from states to allocations, and social choice sets
as collections of social choice functions. His contributions establish that social
choice sets are Bayesian implementable only if they satisfy closure (C), incentive
compatibility (IC), and Bayesian monotonicity (BM) conditions. Moreover, these
three conditions are su±cient to implement a social choice set in any economic
environment involving at least three agents.1 Unfortunately, the same su±ciency
result does not hold in noneconomic environments. Jackson shows that a social
choice set in any noneconomic environment is implementable if it satis¯es (C), (IC)
and monotonicity-no-veto (MNV), a condition combining Bayesian monotonicity
and no-veto conditions. Since (MNV) is not necessary, there exists a gap between
necessary and su±cient conditions for Bayesian implementation in noneconomic
environments. Jackson is quick to realize that Danilov's (1989) single condition,
namely essential monotonicity (EM), that characterizes Nash implementable social
choice correspondences can be helpful along this line.2
Danilov (1989, 1992) shows that any Nash implementable social choice cor-
respondence (SCC) - from preferences to alternatives - is essentially monotone.
Conversely, if a SCC is essentially monotone and there are at least three agents
in the environment, then the SCC is implementable via Nash equilibria. Essen-
tial monotonicity is stronger than monotonicity, a necessary condition for Nash
implementation. On the other hand, essential monotonicity is weaker than mono-
tonicity + no-veto power, which are su±cient conditions of Nash implementation
when there are at least three agents, a fact proved by Maskin (1977). Analogously,
to reduce the gap in Bayesian implementation, we wish carefully translate (EM)
to get a condition stronger than (BM) while weaker than (MNV).
The environment that we consider di®ers from that of Jackson in two aspects.
First, an agent's characteristics include, in addition to a speci¯cation of his private
information, a commonly known type parameter. The two attributes are both
unknown to the designer. Second, instead of social choice sets, we deal with social
choice correspondences assigning the commonly known types of individuals to social
choice sets. Like in Jackson's model, however, each social choice function within a
given social choice set maps the private type pro¯les to allocations. The problem
of implementation is then to design a strategic outcome function whose equilibria
for any environment coincides with the social choice correspondence.
1See, also, Matsushima (1990) for similar results in economic environments.
2A full characterization of necessary and su±cient conditions of Nash implementation is due to
Moore and Repullo (1990). Danilov's (1989, 1992) single condition reduces Moore and Repullo's
three conditions to one.
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The distinction in the environment with regard to the previous literature has
an important implication. In a single framework, we merge two models of imple-
mentation: Nash implementation model and Bayesian implementation model. We
show that conditions characterizing implementable social choice correspondences
select, up to some required generalizations and modi¯cations, from the respective
conditions for Nash implementation and Bayesian implementation.
Any SCC in our framework is implementable only if it satis¯es conditions gen-
eralizing Danilov's essential monotonicity and Jackson's closure, incentive com-
patibility and Bayesian monotonicity provided that the domain of preferences is
su±ciently rich. In economic environments involving rich preference domains and
at least three agents, the same conditions are also su±cient to fully implement an
SCC.
However, in noneconomic environments the su±ciency conditions must in-
volve a generalized monotonicity-no-veto (GMNV) condition replacing generalized
Bayesian monotonicity. So, with regards to Jackson (1991), the gap between neces-
sary and su±cient conditions in noneconomic environments remains to exist, since
(GMNV) is not necessary. To ¯ll this gap, we de¯ne a new condition on SCC,
which we call essential-generalized-Bayesian monotonicity (EGBM). This condi-
tion is a stronger de¯nition of Bayesian monotonicity in the literature. We show
that in our uni¯ed framework (EGBM) is necessary for Bayesian implementation
if the domain of preferences is su±ciently rich. Unfortunately, not all social choice
correspondences satisfying (EGBM) together with the other necessary conditions
are implementable.
Two particular cases within our uni¯ed framework are of a special interest. In
one extreme case in which the information set of each agent is a singleton, the
model boils down to the Nash implementation model considered by Danilov. In
the other extreme case in which the society is known to have a single type, the
model coincides with Bayesian implementation model of Jackson.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 introduces the environment that heav-
ily borrows from Jackson (1991), and de¯nes social choice correspondences. Section
3 provides the de¯nitions that generalize and merge the notions in the Bayesian
model of Jackson and the complete information model of Danilov. In Section 4
we describe the implementation problem, and in Section 5 we unify the theories
of Nash implementation and Bayesian implementation. Finally, in Section 6 we
strengthen the necessary conditions for implementation, using Danilov's notion of
essential elements.
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2. Basic Structures
Environments
There are a ¯nite number, N , of agents. Agent i has two attributes µi and si.
The parameter µi is common knowledge while si is privately known by agent i.
Henceforth, we will use the term type for µi and information set for si.
Let £i be the set of possible types of agent i. A type pro¯le is a vector µ =
(µ1; :::; µN ) and the set of all type pro¯les is £ = £1 £ ::: £ £N . Let Si describe
the ¯nite number of possible information sets of agent i. A state is a vector s =
(s1; :::; sN ) and the set of states is S = S1£ :::£SN . Both the type pro¯le and the
state of the society are unknown to the designer.
Let A denote the set of feasible allocations. We assume A is ¯xed across states.
A social choice function is a map from states to allocations. The set of all social
choice functions is X = fxjx : S ! Ag.
Each agent i has a probability measure qi de¯ned on S.3 It is assumed that
if qi(s) > 0 for some i and s 2 S, then qj(s) > 0 for all j 6= i. All agents agree
on that T denotes the set of states which occur with positive probability, where
T = fs 2 Sjqi(s) > 0; 8ig.
The sets ¦i are partitions of T de¯ned by qi. For a given information set
si 2 Si, ¼i(si) = ft 2 Sjti = si and qi(t) > 0g denotes the set of states which agent
i believes may be the true state. It is assumed that ¼i(si) 6= ; for all i and si 2 Si.
Let ¦ denote the ¯nest partition which is coarser than each ¦i. For a given state
s 2 S, let ¼(s) be the element of ¦ which contains s.
A preference is a linear order on X. The set of all preferences is denoted as R.
Each agent has preferences over social choice functions which have a conditional
expected utility representation. Given x; y 2 X, si 2 Si, and µ 2 £, agent i's weak
preference relation Ri(si; µi) 2 R is such that
xRi(si; µi)y , X
s2¼i(si)
qi(s)U i[x(s); s; µi] ¸ X
s2¼i(si)
qi(s)U i[y(s); s; µi];
where U i : A £ S £ £i ! IR+ is a state and type dependent utility function.
Preferences are complete and transitive. The strict preference and indi®erence
relations associated with Ri are P i and Ii, respectively.
3For notational simplicity and with no loss of generality in our results, we assume that qi is
type-independent.
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An environment is a collection [N;S;£; A; fqig;fU ig], whose structure is as-
sumed to be common knowledge among agents.
Social Choice Correspondences
A social choice correspondence (SCC) is a nonempty subset F ½ £ £ X (or
F : £ ) X). An SCC F assigns to every type pro¯le µ 2 £, a social choice set
F (µ) ½ X, i.e., a collection of social choice functions.
3. Definitions
Here, we generalize several notions in the Bayesian model of Jackson and the
complete information model of Danilov.
Definition 1: Given a vector or vector of functions v = (v1; :::; vN ), let
(v¡i; ~vi) represent the vector (v1; :::; vi¡1; ~vi; vi+1; :::; vN ).
Definition 2: Let L(x;Ri(si; µi)) be the set of social choice functions to
which agent i of type µi weakly prefers x at state si. This set is de¯ned by
L(x;Ri(si; µi)) = fy 2 X jxRi(si; µi)yg.
Definition 3: The social choice functions x and y are equivalent if x(s) = y(s)
for all s 2 T . The social choice correspondences F and F^ are equivalent if for each
µ and x 2 F (µ) there exists x^ 2 F^ (µ) which is equivalent to x, and for each µ and
x^ 2 F^ (µ) there exists x 2 F (µ) which is equivalent to x^.
Definition 4: Let x=Cz be a splicing of two social choice functions x and z
along a set C 2 S. The social choice function x=Cz is de¯ned by [x=Cz](s) = x(s)
8s 2 C, and [x=Cz](s) = z(s) otherwise.
Definition 5: An environment is said to be economic if for any z 2 X , µ 2 £
and s 2 S, there exist i and j (i 6= j), x 2 X and y 2 X such that x and y are
constant, x=Cz =2 L(z; Ri(si; µi)) and y=Cz =2 L(z; Rj(sj; µi)) for all C ½ S such
that s 2 C. An environment is called noneconomic if it is not economic.
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Definition 6: Let B and D be any disjoint sets of states such that B[D = T
and for any ¼ 2 ¦ either ¼ ½ B or ¼ ½ D. Consider an SCC F , and µ 2 £. The so-
cial choice set F (µ) satis¯es closure (C) if for any x; y 2 F (µ), there exists z 2 F (µ)
such that z(s) = x(s) 8s 2 B and z(s) = y(s) 8s 2 D. The SCC F satis¯es gen-
eralized closure (GC) if for all µ, F (µ) satis¯es (C).
Definition 7: Given i, x 2 X, and ti 2 Si, de¯ne xti by xti(s) = x(s¡i; ti),
s 2 S. Consider an SCC F , and µ 2 £. The social choice set F (µ) satis¯es
incentive compatibility (IC) if for all i, x 2 F (µ), and ti 2 Si,
xti 2 L(x;Ri(si; µi)) 8si 2 Si:
The SCC F satis¯es generalized incentive compatibility (GIC) if for all µ, F (µ)
satis¯es (IC).
Definition 8: A deception for i is a mapping ®i : Si ! Si. Let ® =
(®1; :::; ®N) and ®(s) = [®1(s1); :::; ®N(sN )]. The notation x±® represents the
social choice function which results in x[®(s)] for each s 2 S.
Definition 9: Consider an SCC F , µ 2 £, x 2 F (µ) and a deception ®. The
social choice set F (µ) satis¯es Bayesian monotonicity (BM) if whenever there is
no social choice function in F (µ) which is equivalent to x±®, there exists i; si 2 Si
and y 2 X such that
y±® =2 L(x±®;Ri(si; µi)) while y®i(si) 2 L(x;Ri(ti; µi)) 8ti 2 Si:
The SCC F satis¯es generalized Bayesian monotonicity (GBM) if for all µ, F (µ)
satis¯es (BM).
Definition 10: A social choice function z 2 X satis¯es the no-veto hypothesis
(NVH) for ®, µ and D ½ T , if for each s 2 D there exists i such that for each j 6= i
and ~z 2 X there is a set C ½ D such that s 2 C and ~z±®=Cz 2 L(z; Rj(sj; µj)).
Definition 11: Consider an SCC F , a deception ®, and for each µ^ 2 £,
x 2 F (µ^), and i, a set Bi
x;µ^
½ Si. Let Bx;µ^ = B1x;µ^ £ ::: £ BNx;µ^. Suppose that
there exists z such that for each µ^ 2 £, x 2 F (µ^) and s 2 Bx;µ^, z(s) = x±®(s).
Furthermore, suppose that z satis¯es (NVH) for ®, µ and T ¡ ([µ^2£ [x2F (µ^) Bx;µ^).
F satis¯es generalized-monotonicity-no-veto (GMNV) if whenever there is no social
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choice function in F (µ) which is equivalent to z, there exist i, µ^ 2 £, x 2 F (µ^),
s 2 [¹µ2¹£xBx;¹µ where ¹£x = fµ : x 2 F (µ)g, and y; ~z, and ¹z 2 X, such that
¹z(t) = y±®(t) when t 2 [¹µ2¹£xBx;¹µ; ¹z(t) = z(t) when t¡i 2 [¹µ2 ¹£¹xB¡i¹x;¹µ for some ¹x
such that ¹x 6= x; and ¹z(t) = ~z±®(t) otherwise; and
¹z =2 L(z; Ri(si; µi)); while y®i(si) 2 L(x;Ri(ti; µi)) 8ti 2 Si:
If £ is a singleton, every SCC is a social choice set; hence (GC), (GIC), (GBM)
and (GMNV), respectively, reduce to the conditions (C), (IC), (BM) and (MNV)
de¯ned by Jackson (1991) for social choice sets.
Definition 12: Let i be an agent and Y ½ X. A social choice function y 2 Y
is essential for i in set Y if y 2 F (µ) for some µ 2 £ and L(y; Ri(si; µi)) ½ Y for
all si 2 Si.
Given the social choice correspondence F , the set of all essential elements for i in
Y ½ X is denoted by Ess(F ; i; Y ) or simply Ess(i; Y ). Obviously Ess(F ; i; Y ) ½
Y , and if Z ½ Y ½ X then Ess(i; Z) ½ Ess(i; Y ). Moreover, Ess(F ; i; X) =
[µ2£ F (µ).
Definition 13: The SCC F satis¯es generalized-essential monotonicity (GEM)
if for µ; µ^ 2 £, and x 2 F (µ) the relations
Ess(F ; i; L(x;Ri(ti; µi))) ½ L(x;Ri(ti; µ^i)) 8ti 2 Si and 8i
imply x 2 F (µ^).
Generalized-essential-monotonicity means that the social choice function x sur-
vives not only at an improvement of position of x at all states but also when its
position gets nonessentially worse at some states of the society. In the case in which
S is a singleton, (GEM) boils down to Danilov's essential monotonicity condition
(EM).
Finally, we will de¯ne environments that are su±ciently rich in the preferences
of its agents.
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Definition 14: Consider any linear order ~R 2 R. The environment satis¯es
rich domain hypothesis (RDH) if for each i there exists µi 2 £i such thatRi(si; µi) =
~R for all si 2 Si.
4. Implementation
A mechanism is an action space M =M1 £ :::£MN and a map ¹ :M ! A.
A strategy for agent i is a map ¾i : Si ! M i. Denote by §i the set of all
strategies for agent i, and de¯ne § = §1 £ :::£ §N .
For any ¾ 2 §, ¹(¾) represents the social choice function which results when ¾
is played.
Let µ be a type pro¯le. A vector of strategies ¾ 2 § is a Bayesian (Nash)
equilibrium in the game G(M;¹; µ) if ¹(¾¡i; ~¾i) 2 L(¹(¾); Ri(si; µi)) for all i; si
and ~¾i 2 §i. In other words, ¹(¾¡i;§i) ½ L(¹(¾); Ri(si; µi)) for all i and si.
Let BE(¹; µ) be the set of all Bayesian equilibria in the game G(M;¹; µ). Then
the set of all equilibrium outcomes in this game is de¯ned by E(¹; µ) = ¹(BE(¹; µ)).
A mechanism (M;¹) implements a social choice correspondence F if:
(i) for any µ 2 £ and x 2 F (µ) there exists an equilibrium ¾ 2 BE(¹; µ) with
¹[¾(s)] = x(s) for all s 2 T , and
(ii) for any µ 2 £ and any equilibrium ¾ 2 BE(¹; µ) there exists x 2 F (µ) with
¹[¾(s)] = x(s) for all s 2 T .
In other words, the mechanism (M;¹) implements F if E(¹) is equivalent to
F . A social choice set F is implementable if there exists a mechanism (M;¹) which
implements F .
5. Unifying Theories of Nash Implementation and Bayesian
Implementation
This section begins with the description of essential elements for the equilib-
rium outcomes correspondence, E(¹). Next, we establish the result that E(¹)
satis¯es the condition (GEM) if the domain of preferences is su±ciently rich. First
two lemmas stating the above results actually extend similar results obtained by
Danilov (1992) for the complete information case to our Bayesian framework.
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Lemma 1: Assume the environment satis¯es (RDH). Consider a mechanism
(M;¹), a set Y ½ X, a social choice function y 2 Y and agent i. Then, y 2
Ess(E(¹); i; Y ) if and only if y = ¹(¾¡i; ¾i) where ¹(¾¡i;§i) ½ Y .
Proof: To show the \only if" part, let y 2 Ess(E(¹); i; Y ). Then y 2 E(¹; µ)
for some µ such that y = ¹(¾^¡i; ¾^i) where ¹(¾^¡i;§i) ½ L(y;Ri(si; µi)) ½ Y for
all si 2 Si. Conversely, let y = ¹(¾¡i; ¾i) and ¹(¾¡i;§i) ½ Y . Since the en-
vironment satis¯es (RDH), let µ be such that L(y; Ri(si; µi)) = Y for all si and
y = maxj Rj(sj; µj) for all j 6= i and sj. It is obvious that (¾¡i; ¾i) is Bayesian
equilibrium in the game G(M;¹; µ), and therefore y 2 Ess(E(¹); i; Y ). Q.E.D.
Lemma 2: If the environment satis¯es (RDH), then, for any mechanism (M;¹),
the correspondence E(¹) satis¯es (GEM).
Proof: Let ¾ be a Bayesian equilibrium in the game G(M;¹; µ), and x = ¹(¾).
Then, ¹(¾¡i;§i) ½ L(x;Ri(ti; µi)) for all i and ti. By Lemma 1, ¹(¾¡i;§i) ½
Ess(E(¹); i; L(x;Ri(ti; µi))) for all i and ti. Let µ^ be a type pro¯le satisfying
Ess(F ; i; L(x;Ri(ti; µi))) ½ L(x;Ri(ti; µ^i))
for all i and ti. It follows that ¹(§i; ¾¡i) ½ L(x;Ri(ti; µ^i)), for all i and ti. There-
fore, ¾ is a Bayesian equilibrium in the game G(M;¹; µ^), and x 2 E(¹; µ^). Q.E.D.
Theorem 1: Assume the environment is economic, satis¯es (RDH) and N ¸
3. An SCC F is implementable if and only if there exists an SCC F^ which is
equivalent to F and satis¯es (GC), (GIC), (GEM), and (GBM).
The proof of Theorem 1 appears in the Appendix. The assumptions that the
environment is economic and N ¸ 3 are only needed for the su±ciency part of the
Theorem. If we drop the assumption that the environment is economic, we have
the following su±ciency theorem.
Theorem 2: Assume the environment satis¯es (RDH) and N ¸ 3. An SCC
F is implementable if there exists an SCC F^ which is equivalent to F and satis¯es
(GC), (GIC), (GEM), and (GMNV).
The proof of Theorem 2 appears in the Appendix. Note here that when the type
space £ is ¯nite, the environment [N;S;£; A; fqig;fU ig] can be shown to have the
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same information structure and preferences as the environment [N; S^; A;fq^ig; fU^ ig]
(a standart setting in Bayesian models) with S^; fq^ig and fU^ ig appropriately de-
¯ned. Thus, Theorems 1 and 2 could be proven as corollaries to the corresponding
theorems in Jackson (1991) in situations where £ is ¯nite. This means that (GEM)
is redundant when £ is ¯nite.
In analyzing our ¯rst two results, two particular cases are of a special interest.
First, consider an environment with a single state of the society. Then, the collec-
tion of SCC's which are equivalent to an SCC F consists simply of F itself, and
every SCC satis¯es (GC), (GIC), (EGBM) and (GMNV) regardless (RDH) holds.
So, in both economic and noneconomic environments (GEM) becomes the unique
su±ciency condition if S is a singleton. Moreover, (GEM) reduces to (EM) in such
a case. Thus, we obtain the following result by Danilov (1992) as a straightforward
corollary to our previous two theorems.
Corollary 1: Assume the environment satis¯es (RDH), #S = 1 and N ¸ 3.
A social choice correspondence F is implementable if and only if F satis¯es (EM).
Consider now the other extreme case in which the type space contains a sin-
gle element. In this case, (GEM) has no bite, whereas (GC), (GIC), (GBM) and
(GMNV) reduce to (C), (IC), (BM) and (MNV), respectively. In addition, any
SCC is a social choice set now. Thus, we obtain Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 in
Jackson (1991) as separate corollaries to our ¯rst and second Theorems, respec-
tively.
Corollary 2: Assume the environment is economic, #£ = 1 and N ¸ 3. An
SCC F is implementable if and only if there exists an SCC F^ which is equivalent
to F and satis¯es (C), (IC) and (BM).
Corollary 3: Assume #£ = 1 and N ¸ 3. An SCC F is implementable if
there exists an SCC F^ which is equivalent to F and satis¯es (C), (IC), and (MNV).
Remark 1: Assume the environment is noneconomic and satis¯es (RDH). The
conditions (GC), (GIC), (GEM) and (GBM) are not su±cient for implementation.
In what follows, we extend Example 1 in Jackson (1991) in order to prove the
claim in Remark 1.
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Example 1: Consider the environment in which N = 4, A = fa; bg, £i =
fµi1; µi2; µi3; µi4g, Si = fsi; tig, and T = fs1 = (s1; s2; s3; s4); s2 = (s1; s2; t3; t4); s3 =
(t1; t2; t3; t4)g, the partitions pictured below represent the information structure
implied by T :
States
Agents 1 and 2 [s1 s2] [s3]
Agents 3 and 4 [s1] [s2 s3]
The functional form of the utility functions of agents 1 and 2 is the same as is
that of agents 3 and 4. The utilities representing the preferences are given below.
Agents 1 and 2 Agents 3 and 4
a b a b
U i(:; s1; µ
i
1) 2 1 1 2
U i(:; s2; µ
i
1) 2 1 1 2
U i(:; s3; µ
i
1) 2 1 1 2
U i(:; s1; µ
i
2) 1 1 1 1
U i(:; s2; µ
i
2) 1 1 1 1
U i(:; s3; µi2) 1 1 1 1
U i(:; s1; µ
i
3) 1 2 2 1
U i(:; s2; µi3) 1 2 2 1
U i(:; s3; µi3) 1 2 2 1
U i(:; s1; µi4) 2 1 1 2
U i(:; s2; µi4) 1 1 1 1
U i(:; s3; µ
i
4) 2 1 1 2
Preferences satisfy rich domain hypothesis since the set £4i=1fµi1; µi2; µi3g, alone,
constitutes a rich domain.
Consider the social choice set F (µ) = fx; ¹xg for all µ 2 £, where x(s) = a for
all s 2 S and ¹x(s) = b for all s 2 S.
F satis¯es (GEM) since F is constant on £. F satis¯es (GC) since the common
knowledge concatenation satis¯es ¦ = fTg. Condition (GIC) is satis¯ed since x
and ¹x are constant. Since x±® = x and ¹x±® = ¹x for every deception ®, it follows
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that for every µ 2 £, x±® 2 F (µ) and ¹x±® 2 F (µ) for every deception ®, and so
(GBM) is satis¯ed.
Although F satis¯es (GC), (GIC), (GEM) and (GBM), it is not implementable.
To see this, suppose that a mechanism (M;¹) implements F . Let µ4 = (µ
1
4; µ
2
4; µ
3
4; µ
4
4).
Then there exist equilibrium sets of strategies ¾x; ¾¹x 2 BE(¹; µ4) resulting in x and
¹x on T , respectively. Consider the set of strategies ~¾ de¯ned by ~¾i(si) = ¾x(s
i)
and ~¾i(ti) = ¾¹x(ti). Since each agent i is completely indi®erent at (s2; µi4), ~¾ is an
equilibrium. Notice that ¹[~¾(s1)] = a and ¹[~¾(s3)] = b. However, there is no social
choice function in F (µ4) which coincides with ¹[~¾] on T , which is a contradiction.
Therefore, F is not implementable.
6. Strengthening the Necessary Conditions
We use Danilov's notion of essential elements to strengthen the condition (GBM),
and show that the stronger condition, termed essential-generalized-Bayesian mono-
tonicity (EGBM), is necessary for implementation.
Definition 15: Consider an SCC F , µ 2 £, x 2 F (µ) and deception ®. F
satis¯es essential-generalized-Bayesian monotonicity (EGBM) if whenever there is
no social choice function in F (µ) which is equivalent to x±®, there exists i; si 2 Si
and y 2 X such that
y±® =2 L(x±®;Ri(si; µi)); while y®i(si) 2 Ess(F ; i; L(x;Ri(ti; µi))) 8ti 2 Si:
Lemma 3: Any social choice correspondence satis¯es (GBM) if it satis¯es
(EGBM).
Proof: Obvious from the inclusionsEss(F ; i; L(x;Ri(ti; µi))) ½ L(x;Ri(ti; µi))
for all i; x; µi and ti.
The preceding result is valid for both economic and noneconomic environments.
However, Examples 2 and 3 below show that the converse of Lemma 3 is not true
in either type of environments.
Example 2: Consider the environment in which N = 6, A = fa; b; c; dg,
£ = fµ = (µ1; :::; µ6)g, S1 = fv1; w1g, Si = fvig for all i 6= 1, and T = S =
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fs1 = (v1; :::; v6); s2 = (w1; v2; :::; v6)g. The partitions pictured below represent the
information structure implied by T :
States
Agent 1 [s1] [s2]
Agents 2-6 [s1 s2]
Agents 1 and 2 have identical and state-independent utility functions at all
states as do agents 3, 4 and 5, 6:
Agents 1 and 2 Agents 3 and 4 Agents 5 and 6
a b c d a b c d a b c d
U i(:; s; µi) 10 10 12 4 10 10 4 12 10 10 4 4
for all s 2 S.
The priors fqig are given as follows: qi(s) = 0:5 for all i and s. It follows that
q1(s1jv1) = 1, q1(s2jw1) = 1, and qi(sjjvi) = 0:5, for all i 6= 1 and j = 1; 2.
Consider the following social choice functions in X that we will refer to.
s1 s2 s1 s2
x1(:) a a x5(:) d d
x2(:) a b x6(:) d c
x3(:) b a x7(:) c d
x4(:) b b x8(:) c c
Let SCC be given by the formula F (µ) = fx1; x2; x3g.
To check that F satis¯es (GBM), consider x 2 F (µ). Let ® be any deception
such that x±® =2 F (µ). It is clear that x 6= x1 since x1±® = x1 2 F (µ). Thus,
x 2 fx2; x3g and x±® = x4. Without loss of generality assume x = x2, i.e.
x(s1) = a and x(s2) = b. Then, ® must be such that ®(s1) = ®(s2) = s2, i.e.
®1(v1) = ®1(w1) = w1 and ®i(vi) = vi for all i 6= 1.
Now, consider x6 and agent 2. Notice that x6±® = x8, and x8 =2 L(x2; R2(v2; µ2))
since X
s2¼2(v2)
q2(sjv2)U2[x8(s); s; µ2] = (0:5)(12) + (0:5)(12) = 12 >
X
s2¼2(v2)
q2(sjv2)U2[x4(s); s; µ2] = (0:5)(10) + (0:5)(10) = 10:
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On the other hand, x6(:; ®
2(v2)) 2 L(x2; R2(v2; µ2)) since x6(:; ®2(v2)) = x6 andX
s2¼2(v2)
q2(sjv2)U2[x6(s); s; µ2] = (0:5)(4) + (0:5)(12) = 8 <
X
s2¼2(v2)
q2(sjv2)U2[x2(s); s; µ2] = (0:5)(10) + (0:5)(10) = 10:
(Note that for x = x3, the social choice function x6 can be changed with x7 in
the above lines, with the relevant inequalities still holding.) Therefore, F satis¯es
(GBM).
Despite this fact, F does not satisfy (EGBM). This is seen as follows. Suppose
there exists a social choice function y 2 X such that for some i and si, y±® =2
L(x±® ;Ri(si; µi)) while y®i(si) 2 Ess(F ; i; L(x;Ri(ti; µi))) for all ti. Then i 2
f1; 2; 3; 4g since it can be easily veri¯ed that x±® = x4 is among the most preferred
social choice functions for agents 5 and 6. It must be true that y(t) = a for
some t by the supposition that y®i(si) 2 F (µ). Moreover, there exists t such that
y(t) = c if i 2 f1; 2g and y(t) = d if i 2 f3; 4g, by the supposition that y±® =2
L(x±®;Ri(si; µi)) and the construction of U i's. So, given x = x2 and x±® = x4, we
must have y(s1) = a, y(s2) = c if i 2 f1; 2g and y(s2) = d if i 2 f3; 4g. Consider
agent 1, ¯rst. Since ®1(v1) = ®1(w1) = w1, y®1(s1) = x8 for all s
1 2 S1. But,
x8 =2 F (µ). Next, consider agents 2,3 and 4. We have ®i(vi) = vi, and hence
y®i(vi) = y for all i 2 f1; 2; 3g. But, y =2 F (µ). Therefore, we have established that
yi®(s
i) =2 F (µ) for all i 2 f1; 2; 3; 4g and si, which is a contradiction. Therefore, F
does not satisfy (EGBM).
Finally, we will show that the environment is economic. Let z be a social choice
function in X. Consider the following cases:
Case 1: z(s) 2 fa; b; dg for all s. Notice that x8 is constant, and for all C ½ S
such that s 2 C, x8=Cz =2 L(z; Ri(si; µi)) for i = 1; 2.
Case 2: z(s) 2 fa; b; cg for all s. Notice that x5 is constant, and for all C ½ S
such that s 2 C, x5=Cz =2 L(z; Ri(si; µi)) for i = 3; 4.
Case 3: z(s) 2 fc; dg for all s. Notice that x1 is constant, and for all C ½ S
such that s 2 C, x1=Cz =2 L(z; Ri(si; µi)) for i = 5; 6.
Thus, for any given social choice function and state, there are at least two
agents who prefer to alter the social choice function at that state, and therefore
the environment is economic.
Example 3: Drop agents 3,4,5 and 6 in the environment described in Example
2. Obviously, this environment, like the one in Example 2, satis¯es (GBM) but
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not (EGBM). However, in this case the environment is noneconomic. To see this,
consider x8. For all x 2 X such that x is constant, x=Cx8 2 L(x8; Ri(si; µi)) for all
i 2 f1; 2g and for all C ½ S such that s 2 C. That is to say, agents 1 and 2 are
simultaneously satiated at x8.
Lemma 4: If the environment satis¯es (RDH), then, for any mechanism ¹, the
correspondence E(¹) satis¯es (EGBM).
Proof: Let ¾ be a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in the game G(M;¹; µ), and
x = ¹(¾), i.e. x(s) = ¹[¾(s)] for all s 2 S. Consider that for some deception ®,
there exists no z 2 F such that z(s) = x±®(s) for all s 2 T . It must be that ¾±®
is not an equilibrium at some s 2 T . Therefore there exist i and m^ 2 M i such that
¹[(¾¡i; ¾^i)±®] =2 L(¹[¾±®]; Ri(si; µi)), where ¾^i(ti) = m^i for all ti 2 S. Let y =
¹(¾¡i; ¾^i). From above y±® =2 L(x±®;Ri(si; µi)). Since ¾^i is constant, y®i(si) = y =
¹(¾¡i; ¾^i). We know that ¹(¾¡i;§i) ½ L(¹(¾); Ri(ti; µi)) for all ti 2 Si, since ¾ is
Bayesian equilibrium. From Lemma 1, ¹(¾¡i;§i) ½ Ess(E(¹); i; L(¹(¾); Ri(ti; µ)))
for all ti 2 Si. Thus, y®i(si) 2 Ess(E(¹); i; L(x;Ri(ti; µ))) for all ti 2 Si. Q.E.D.
In the light of Lemma 4, we can now state a stronger necessity result.
Theorem 3: Assume the environment satis¯es (RDH). A social choice corre-
spondence F is implementable only if there exists a social choice correspondence F^
which is equivalent to F and satis¯es (GC), (GIC), (GEM), and (EGBM).
The proof of Theorem 3 is omitted as it is similar to that of the necessity portion
of Theorem 1. It is important to note here that replacing the necessary condition
(GBM) with a stronger condition (EGBM) is possible if the domain of preferences is
su±ciently rich. Such a strengthening in necessary conditions may not be possible
if we drop the hypothesis (RDH). In order to illustrate this claim, we will show
that (EGBM) is not necessary to implement an SCC in Jackson's environments,
which do not satisfy (RDH), unless, of course, the set of social choice functions X
is a singleton.
We consider the economic environment in Example 2, which conforms with
Jackson's Bayesian model. There, we have #£ = 1, S = T and N = 6. We
established in Example 2 that the SCC satis¯es (GBM). Clearly, (GEM) has no
bite when #£ = 1. The SCC satis¯es (GC) since ¦ = fTg. The SCC also satis¯es
(GIC), since for all x 2 F (µ) and s 2 S, x(s) 2 fa; bg, and U i(a; s; µi) = U i(b; s; µi)
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for all i and s 2 S. Given #£ = 1, the SCC is actually a social choice set; so it
satis¯es (BM), (C) and (IC). Therefore, the SCC in Example 2 is implementable,
since a result (Corollary 1) in Jackson (1991) states that in economic environments
where S = T and N ¸ 3, a social choice set is implementable if it satis¯es (C),
(IC) and (BM). However, we showed in Example 2 that the SCC does not satisfy
(EGBM).
The condition (EGBM) certainly narrows down the gap between necessary and
su±cient conditions in noneconomic environments that satisfy (RDH). An impor-
tant question is to see if (EGBM) closes the gap.
Remark 2: Assume the environment is noneconomic and satis¯es (RDH). The
conditions (GC), (GIC), (GEM) and (EGBM) are not su±cient for implementation.
The above claim is true, as it can be easily veri¯ed that the nonimplementable
SCC F in Example 1 satis¯es (EGBM) since for all µ the social choice set F (µ)
consists of constant social choice functions.
APPENDIX
The proofs of Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 closely follow the respective proofs in
Jackson (1991) established for social choice sets.
Proof of Theorem 2: The following mechanism, which slightly extends the
mechanism proposed by Jackson for social choice sets, implements the SCC F if
the conditions of Theorem 2 are met. Let ¹S = maxi#S
i and n = N + N ¹S. Let
V = f0; 1; :::; ¹S2gn. Thus v 2 V is an (N +N ¹S)-dimensional vector such that each
entry is an integer between 0 and ¹S2. Let M i = fmi 2 £ £ Si £ [µF (µ) £ f; [
V g £X £f; [Xg jmi3 2 F (mi1)g and M =M1 £ :::£MN . Partition M into sets:
d0 = fm 2 M j9x 2 F (µ) s.t. mj = (µ; ¢; x; ;; ¢; ;) 8jg;
di1 = fm 2 M jm =2 d0; 9x 2 F (µ) s.t. mj = (µ; ¢; x;;; ¢; ;) 8j 6= i
and mi = (¢; ¢; x; ¢; ¢;;) or (¢; ¢; ¹x; ¢; ¢; ¢)g;
di2 = fm 2 M j9x 2 F (µ) s.t. mj = (µ; ¢; x; ;; ¢; ;) 8j 6= i
and mi = (¢; ¢; x; ¢; ¢; y)g;
d3 = fm 2 M jm =2 d1 [ d2g:
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Let d2 = [idi2 and d1 = [idi1.
De¯ne the payo® function ¹ :M ! X by
¹(m) = x(m2); m 2 d0 [ d1;
¹(m) = y(m2); m 2 di2 and ymi2 2 L(x;Ri(ti; µi)) for all ti 2 Si;
¹(m) = x(m2); m 2 di2 and ymi2 =2 L(x;Ri(ti; µi)) for some ti 2 Si;
¹(m) = mi
¤
5 (m2); m 2 d3;
where i¤ is determined as follows: Let I¤ = fijmi4 6= ;g and for i 2 I¤ denote mi4
by vi. Let J(i) be the number of j 2 I¤ such that vil = vji for an integer l where
N + (j ¡ 1) ¹S < l  N + j ¹S. If there exists i 2 I¤ such that J(i) > J(k) for all
k 2 I¤, then i¤ = i, otherwise i¤ = 1.
Remark 3: For any i and ¾ there exists vi 2 V such that such that ~¾i,
where ~¾i4(s
i) = vi for all si and ~¾ = ¾ otherwise, is such that i¤ = i whenever
[¾¡i; ~¾i](s) 2 d3.
The following lemmas establish Theorem 2.
Lemma 5: If F satis¯es (GIC), then for each µ and x 2 F (µ) there is a set of
strategies ¾ which form an equilibrium to the game G(M;¹; µ) such that ¹(¾) = x.
Proof: Given an arbitrary µ 2 £, x 2 F (µ), we consider ¾ de¯ned by ¾i(si) =
(µ; si; x;;; ¢; ;). Notice that ¹[¾(s)] = x(s) for all s 2 S. We verify that ¾ is
an equilibrium by showing that there are no improving deviations. Consider a
deviation ~mi by i at si 2 Si.
If ~mi = (~µ; ~si; x; ¢; ¢; ;) or ~mi = (~µ; ~si; ¹x; ¢; ¢; ¢) then [¾¡i(s¡i); ~mi] 2 d0[d1 (where
it is possible that ~µ = µ and ~si = si). The resulting allocation is x~si (on ¼
i(si)).
From (GIC) we know that this is not improving.
If ~mi = (~µ; ~si; x; ¢; ¢; y), then [¾¡i(s¡i); ~mi] 2 d2 (where it is possible that ~µ = µ
and ~si = si). If y~si 2 L(x;Ri(ti; µi)) for all ti 2 Si, then the allocation is y~si (on
¼i(si)), which is not improving. Otherwise the allocation is x~si (on ¼
i(si)), which
is not improving by (GIC).
Lemma 6: If F satis¯es (GC), (GEM) and (GMNV), then for each set of
strategies ¾ which form an equilibrium to the game G(M;¹; µ) there exists z 2 F (µ)
which is equivalent to ¹(¾).
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Proof: Let ¾ be an equilibrium to G(M;¹; µ) and let ® describe the announce-
ment of s (m2 as a function of s) under ¾. For each i, µ^ 2 £ and x 2 F (µ^), let
Bi
x;µ^
= fsi : ¾i(si) = (µ^; ®i(si); x; ;; :; ;)g.
Since ¾ is an equilibrium, ¹(¾) satis¯es (NV H) for ®, µ and T ¡ ([µ^2£ [x2F (µ^)
Bx;µ^). This is seen as follows. Suppose that ¹(¾) does not satisfy (NVH) for ®, µ
and T ¡ ([µ^2£ [x2F (µ^) Bx;µ^). Then there exist s 2 T ¡ ([µ^2£ [x2F (µ^) Bx;µ^), j, and
zj such that zj±® =C¹(¾) =2 L(¹(¾);Rj(sj; µj)) for all C ½ T ¡ ([µ^2£ [x2F (µ^) Bx;µ^)
such that s 2 C. Since the failure of (NV H) guarantees the existence of two such
agents, and since s =2 ([µ^2£ [x2F (µ^)Bx;µ^), j can be chosen such that ¾(s) =2 dj1 [ dj2.
Let ~mj be the same as ¾j(sj) except that ~mj4 = v
j as de¯ned in Remark 3, and
mj5 = z
j. Let C be the set of t 2 ¼j(sj) such that [¾¡j(t¡j); ~mj] 2 d3. The
outcome on C is thus zj±®. Furthermore, s 2 C, since [¾¡j(s¡j); ~mj] 2 d3, and
C ½ T ¡ ([µ^2£[x2F (µ^)Bx;µ^). From the design of ~mj it follows that if t 2 ¼j(sj) and
t =2 C, then [¾¡j(t¡j); ~mj] leads to the same outcome as ¾. Hence, the outcome of
the deviation is zj±® on C \ ¼j(sj) and ¹(¾) otherwise. This is improving for j,
which contradicts the fact that ¾ is an equilibrium.
It has been established that ¹(¾) satis¯es (NVH) for ®, µ, and T¡([µ^2£[x2F (µ^)
Bx;µ^). Next, (MNV ) is applied to ¯nd a social choice function in F (µ) which is
equivalent to ¹(¾).
Suppose that there does not exist a social choice function in F (µ) which is
equivalent to ¹(¾). By (GMNV ) there exist i, µ^ 2 £, x 2 F (µ^), y; ~z; ¹z and
si 2 [¹µ2¹£xBix;¹µ, where ¹£x = fµ : x 2 F (µ)g, such that ¹z(s) = y±® when
s 2 [¹µ2 ¹£xBx;¹µ; ¹z(s) = ¹[¾(s)] when s¡i 2 [¹µ2 ¹£¹xB¡i¹x;¹µ for some ¹x such that ¹x 6= x;
and ¹z(s) = ~z±® otherwise; and such that ¹z =2 L(¹(¾); Ri(si; µi)), while y®i(si) 2
L(x;Ri(ti; µi)) 8ti 2 Si. Therefore i is better o® submitting [µ^; ®i(si); x; vi; ~z; y]
(where vi is de¯ned in Remark 3) whenever si is observed, since the resulting out-
come is ¹z on ¼i(si). This is shown as follows: The deviation puts the action in di2
for all s 2 [¹µ2 ¹£xBx;¹µ, and the outcome is y±®. The action is in di1 for all s 2 ¼i(si)
such that s¡i 2 [¹µ2 ¹£¹xB¡i¹x;¹µ for some ¹x such that ¹x 6= x, and the outcome remains
¹[¾(s)]. For any other s 2 ¼i(si) the deviation puts the action in d3 with i¤ = i and
the outcome ~z±®(s). Thus the outcome is ¹z on ¼i(si) which is strictly preferred
by i to ¹(¾) on ¼i(si). This contradicts the fact that ¾ is an equilibrium, and so
the supposition was wrong. Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 1: The su±ciency part follows from Theorem 2. In an
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environment which satis¯es (E), (NVH) can never be satis¯ed. Therefore given
(GC), (GMNV) and (GBM) are equivalent. The necessity part of the theorem is
now checked.
Let ¹ implement F and de¯ne F^ such that
F^ (µ) = fxjx = ¹(¾) for some equilibrium ¾ in the game G(M;¹; µ)g:
From the de¯nition of implementation F^ is equivalent to F . It is obvious that F^
satis¯es (GC). Consider any µ 2 £. F^ (µ) satis¯es (IC) and (BM), by the proof
of Theorem 1 in Jackson (1991). So, F^ satis¯es (GIC) and (GBM). Since the en-
vironment satis¯es (RDH), E(¹) satis¯es (GEM) by Lemma 2. Thus, F^ satis¯es
(GEM) since F^ = E(¹). Q.E.D.
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